Dialogus Bureau
New Delhi: Bangladesh is moving toward its 13th parliamentary election, scheduled for February 2026, under the supervision of a restructured Election Commission. The EC has announced that the final voter list, expected to include all citizens who turn 18 by October 31, 2025, will be published on November 18, following the release of a draft list on November 1.
In the weeks between, objections, corrections, and appeals will be heard before the official roll is certified. This procedural overhaul is part of a broader effort to restore confidence in Bangladesh’s democratic process, which has been the subject of intense domestic and international scrutiny after the ouster of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in nationwide student-led protests. Up to 1,400 people died in last summer’s unrest, according to UN investigators. Hasina, who fled to India, and her party Awami League has rejected all charges of authorizing a deadly crackdown on the protesters against her.
Transparency International Bangladesh’s executive director Iftekharuzzaman, who also serves on the Mohammad Yunus-led interim government’s National Consensus Commission, has warned that institutional neutrality will be the ultimate test: “If political parties themselves do not want a fair election, it will be difficult to ensure neutrality. That is why it is essential to guarantee impartiality among election observers and journalists,” he said.
“A free, fair and participatory election can only be held when the interim government has completed its mandate to carry out vital reforms,” Yunus has said, assuring that electoral, judicial, administrative and media reforms will be in place before the national polls.
These internal reforms are not taking place in isolation; they are deeply intertwined with Bangladesh’s foreign relations, particularly with its largest neighbour, India.
Historical Backdrop
The Indo-Bangla relationship was born out of a shared struggle. In 1972, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace, which promised mutual respect, non-interference, and close collaboration. This laid the foundation for the warmest period in New Delhi’s bilateral history with Dhaka.
However, successive military regimes in Bangladesh and the transition to multi-party democracy during the 1980s and 1990s disrupted this closeness. Issues such as border skirmishes, migration concerns, and river water sharing — particularly the Ganges and Teesta — created points of friction.
The relationship regained stability from 2009 onwards, under Sheikh Hasina’s premiership. With her in power, Dhaka and New Delhi achieved notable progress in trade, cross-border connectivity, and regional energy projects. Hasina was also sensitive to India’s security concerns and managed her government’s ties with Beijing in ways that “never undermined Dhaka’s relationship with New Delhi”. Major achievements such as the Tin Bigha Corridor agreement, the settlement of enclaves, and power import deals reflected this renewed partnership.
Pic courtesy Vecteezy.com
The Yunus Shift
The resignation of Hasina in August 2024 and the installation of Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus as head of the interim government introduced a visible recalibration in Bangladesh’s external outlook. Yunus has frequently remarked that “Bangladesh wanted good ties with India, but something always went wrong”. His foreign policy approach has emphasised sovereignty, fairness, and institutional legitimacy, rather than leader-driven personal alliances.
Unlike Hasina, Yunus has shown openness to engaging more deeply with China and Pakistan, signaling that India’s role – while still important – will no longer be taken for granted. Analysts at South Asian Voices note that Yunus is attempting to “reset relations based on fairness and equity”, positioning Dhaka as a more autonomous regional actor rather than a junior partner.
This recalibration is mirrored domestically in institutional reforms. The Election Commission Secretariat (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, and the Election Officers (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2025, recently approved by the Council of Advisers, grant the EC unprecedented independence. It now has its own service commission to recruit staff and authority to discipline polling officials: reforms designed to depersonalize governance and ensure accountability.
The Jamaat Factor
The shifting political landscape has also opened space for Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party. Banned under Hasina’s government, Jamaat regained its registration in August 2024 when the interim administration concluded there was “no specific evidence” linking it to terrorism.
Since then, Jamaat has mobilized forcefully. In July 2025, it held a massive rally in Dhaka where leaders demanded electoral reform, proportional representation, and justice for historical injustices. Mujibur Rahman, the party chief, declared, “We want justice and reform first, then national elections … If elections are held like before, what is the need for those elections?”
Jamaat’s re-entry reflects both the vacuum left by Hasina’s departure and the growing appeal of Islamist politics among segments of the population disillusioned with mainstream parties. The party is also forming strategic alliances, including with the newly formed National Citizen Party, signaling an effort to expand influence beyond its traditional base.
“Jamaat-e-Islami's resurgence in Bangladesh politics is reshaping the electoral landscape, as they seek to influence the political system through alliances and advocacy for proportional representation," said a Dhaka-based political scholar.
Institutional Reform
With more than 126 million registered voters, including over 1,200 third-gender citizens, the upcoming voter roll will be the largest in the country’s history. By empowering the Election Commission with its own service commission and disciplinary authority, the interim government aims to prevent the allegations of bias that plagued past elections. As one EC directive stresses, “The Commission will resolve all claims and appeals by 17 November to ensure no voter is disenfranchised.”
These steps are crucial in signaling to both domestic constituencies and international observers that Bangladesh is committed to transparent elections.
Road Ahead For Indo-Bangla Relations
Looking forward, two scenarios are plausible:
A Fair and Inclusive Election
If the 2026 polls are widely seen as credible – with Jamaat and other opposition groups allowed meaningful participation – India could find a more stable and cooperative partner in Dhaka. This would pave the way for progress on unresolved issues such as the Teesta water treaty, border management, and regional transit rights. In such a scenario, bilateral trade and infrastructure cooperation would likely deepen, building on Hasina-era achievements while expanding into new sectors.
A Contested Election
Conversely, if the election is marred by irregularities, India may face a more complex Dhaka that prioritizes autonomy and rebalances foreign policy toward Beijing or Islamabad. A stronger Jamaat presence in parliament could also influence the tone of Bangladesh’s diplomacy, potentially making cultural and migration issues more contentious. In this case, New Delhi might recalibrate its engagement by demanding stronger guarantees on democratic standards as a precondition for deepened cooperation.
Bangladesh is in the midst of a pivotal transition: restructured electoral institutions, the revival of Jamaat-e-Islami, and a foreign policy reset under Yunus are redefining both domestic politics and external alignments. Historically, Indo-Bangla relations have mirrored Bangladesh’s internal trajectory – from Mujib’s warmth to military-era strains, Hasina’s strategic partnership, and now Yunus’ recalibration.
“Bangladesh needs to ascertain the will and mandate of the people by holding an inclusive, fair and free election,” said Randhir Jaiswal, Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson.
The 2026 election will therefore be more than a domestic milestone; it will shape the very nature of India-Bangladesh ties in the coming decade. Should the process deliver fairness and inclusivity, Dhaka and New Delhi may usher in a new era of balanced, mutually respectful cooperation. If not, the region risks entering a period of distrust, with wide-ranging consequences for trade, security, and diplomacy across South Asia.